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Nothing to Hide: Why Metadata Should Be 
Presumed Relevant* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The amount of information being produced electronically is large 
and continues to grow.  In fact, [n]inety-two percent of new information 
is stored on [electronic] media.1  Individuals and businesses are also 
increasingly relying on electronic modes of communication.2  As the 
prevalence of electronic documents increases, it is likely that the only 
record companies have of their business decisions, results, and strategies 
are maintained in electronic form.3  In fact, a majority of corporate 
records are stored electronically.4  These electronic documents, because 
they contain metadatainformation describing the history, tracking, or 
management of an electronic document5are of more value in the 
discovery process than their paper counterparts.6 
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 1. PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2003 (2003), http://www2. 
sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable_execsum.pdf (last visited Dec. 
29, 2007). 
 2. Dennis R. Kiker, Waiving the Privilege in a Storm of Data: An Argument for Uniformity 
and Rationality in Dealing with the Inadvertent Production of Privileged Materials in the Age of 
Electronically Stored Information, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, ¶¶ 36 (2006), http://law.richmond. 
edu/jolt/v12i4/article15.pdf.  The increase in use of electronic information is particularly evident in 
communication, as computer users sent approximately 31 billion e-mail messages every day in 
2002.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
 3. Stephen D. Williger & Robin M. Wilson, Negotiating the Minefields of Electronic 
Discovery, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 52, ¶ 57 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article52.pdf. 
 4. Lori Enos, Digital Data Changing Legal Landscape, E-COMMERCE TIMES, May 16, 2000, 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/3339.html ([M]ost companies store up to 70 percent of 
their records in electronic form.). 
 5. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005) (quoting the 
proposed advisory committee note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)).  See infra Part II.A. 
 6. James Gibson, A Topic Both Timely and Timeless, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 49, ¶ 3 (2004), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article49.pdf. 
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The increase in volume of electronic information is wreaking havoc 
with discovery rules and litigation practices.7  In the age of electronic 
discovery, litigators must address issues of data preservation, the scope 
of discovery, form of production, privilege waiver as a consequence of 
inadvertent disclosure, and sanctions for abuses.  Perhaps the most 
contentious electronic discovery issue surrounds metadata.8  Metadata 
presents novel issues because every electronic document contains 
metadata,9 metadata potentially is of high evidentiary value,10 and 
metadata is difficult to remove.11 
Metadata gives meaning to much electronic information,12 and thus 
its presence or absence can be outcome determinative.13  Now that a 
majority of information is created and stored electronically,14 the rules 
regarding the role of electronic information in litigation have a 
significant impact.  A rule that allows parties to produce electronic 
information in any manner they choose may leave the seeking party with 
an indecipherable mass of data.  On the other hand, a rule requiring 
metadata preservation may be overly burdensome on the producing party 
and may expose information that the producing party was formerly able 
to shelter in traditional discovery. 
The current trend is to require production of electronic information 
in native format with metadata intact.15  Courts are requiring metadata 
production if the producing party knows or should reasonably know 
that metadata is relevant to the dispute.16  The burden is currently on 
the seeking party to establish relevance if the producing party determines 
metadata is irrelevant.17  A more logical approach, however, is to 
presume metadata relevant and require the producing party to rebut the 
presumption.  A rule that presumes the relevance of metadata better 
                                                     
 7. Kiker, supra note 2, at ¶ 6. 
 8. J. Brian Beckham, Production, Preservation, and Disclosure of Metadata, 7 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006), http://www.stlr.org/html/volume7/beckham.pdf. 
 9. Id. at 3. 
 10. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 11. See Beckham, supra note 8, at 4 (citing David Hricik, The Transmission and Receipt of 
Invisible Confidential Information (2003), http://www.hricik.com./eethics/Metadata1103.doc). 
 12. See infra notes 2532 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 14. See LYMAN & VARIAN, supra note 1. 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
 16. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (quoting THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 47 (July 2005), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/7_05TSP.pdf [hereinafter THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE July 2005]. 
 17. See id. 
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serves judicial economy and is consistent with the intent of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in allowing the parties to obtain the fullest 
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.18  Because 
metadata is so closely related to the information contained in the 
electronic document, metadata will rarely be irrelevant when the 
electronic document to which the metadata pertains is relevant.  A 
corollary to this proposal is that parties should be required to maintain 
metadata when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.  A rule presuming the 
relevance and requisite production of metadata ensures that metadata, 
which may be determinative in a case, will be preserved for litigation. 
Contrary to arguments commonly offered by producing parties, 
especially those frequently involved in litigation, production of large 
quantities of electronic information will not have a crippling effect.19  
The producing party is actually obligated to do less work if required to 
produce electronic documents in the form in which they are produced 
and maintained; with metadata intact.  One magistrate judge has 
described the process of removing metadata as laborious and counter-
intuitive.20  Furthermore, when courts require production of electronic 
information in native format, the court provides a check on producing 
parties to ensure electronic documents are not altered between the time 
when litigation was foreseeable and the commencement of discovery.21  
Finally, because the trend is toward requiring metadata production, 
attorneys will be forced to become competent regarding metadata.  As a 
result, problems surrounding metadata, such as inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information, will occur less often.  The end result is that the 
court will have a more complete record on which to rule and justice will 
be better served. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the evidentiary value of metadata 
and the effect of a rebuttable presumption of metadata relevance.  I 
describe how this presumption meshes with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the recent amendments thereto.  I also discuss how 
requiring metadata production is an increasing trend and describe how 
courts are tempering the requirement.  Part III begins by using Williams 
v. Sprint/United Management Co.22 to illustrate the value of metadata in 
                                                     
 18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
 19. Contra Holt v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:04-CV-280, 2005 WL 3262420, at *4 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing arguments against producing larger quantities of electronic 
information). 
 20. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc., No. MD 05-1720(JG)(JO), 2007 WL 
121426, at *1, 3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 21. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 22. 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005). 
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discovery.  I then elaborate on the evidentiary value of metadata and 
discuss the benefits of a rebuttable presumption of metadata relevance.  
Next, I describe how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support such a 
presumption and argue that a stricter standard for production and 
preservation is necessary.  I then explain why a stricter rule for electronic 
discovery, compared with traditional paper discovery, is advisable.  
Finally, I describe why a stricter rule on metadata production promotes 
good lawyering. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Metadata Is Rich with Evidentiary Information 
Metadata is the locus of the debate surrounding electronic discovery.  
Metadata is the information about a particular data set which may 
describe how, when, and by whom it was received, created, accessed, 
and/or modified and how it is formatted.23  Metadata serves various 
purposes and functions, including enhanc[ing] the editing, viewing, 
filing, and retrieval of . . . documents.24  [M]etadata can come from a 
variety of sources; it can be created automatically by a computer, 
supplied by a user, or inferred through a relationship with another 
document.25 
Metadata has a significant effect on the evidentiary value of 
electronic documents: metadata is the key to showing relationships 
between the data.26  Metadata reveals a files name, a files location 
(e.g., directory structure or pathname), file format or file type, file size, 
file dates (e.g., creation date, date of last data modification), and file 
permissions (e.g., who can read the data, who can write to it, who can 
run it).27  Metadata reveals authors and editors and edits and changes to 
electronic documents.28  Metadata contained in emails is perhaps the  
 
 
                                                     
 23. Id. at 646 (citing THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 
94 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf. 
 24. Beckham, supra note 8, at 4 (quoting David Hricik, The Transmission and Receipt of 
Invisible Confidential Information 1 (2003), http://www.hricik.com/eethics/2.3.html (last visited Jan. 
23, 2008)). 
 25. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 64647. 
 26. Id. at 647. 
 27. Id. at 646. 
 28. Beckham, supra note 8, at 2. 
07 - BREEN FINAL.DOC 2/13/2008  4:42:38 PM 
2008] NOTHING TO HIDE 443 
most charged form of metadata because it discloses when a message was 
sent.29  Email metadata also reveals recipients of blind carbon copies.30 
Some characteristics of metadata create special problems for 
electronic discovery.  Metadata is not staticit is possible for producing 
parties to alter metadata: Metadata can be altered intentionally or 
inadvertently and can be extracted when native files are converted to 
image files.31  Therefore, metadata is not always accurate.  For instance, 
metadata for a form document reflects the author as the person who 
created the template but who did not draft the document.32  Metadata 
can also be deleted or spoliated.33  However, barring alteration, 
deletion, or spoliation, metadata is rich with evidentiary information. 
B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Require Production of 
Relevant Electronic Documents 
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provide That a Party May 
Obtain Any Material Relevant to the Claim 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a background for the 
discussion of electronic discovery.  The Rules apply equally to electronic 
discovery and traditional paper discovery.34  The Rules are intended to 
allow broad discovery,35 and specifically, authorize broad discovery of 
computer-related information, while affording many protections against 
unreasonably intrusive discovery of such materials.36 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) sets the scope of discovery.  
Under Rule 26(b)(1), [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter . . . relevant to the claim or defense of any party.37  [A] request 
for discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that 
the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 14. 
 31. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve 
property for anothers use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.  West v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 34. Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 
2002). 
 35. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 638 (1977). 
 36. Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of EvidenceA New Dimension to Civil 
Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 427 (1999). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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action.38  A producing party bears the burden of establishing lack of 
relevance if the information sought appears facially relevant.39  To 
establish lack of relevance, the producing party must either show the 
discovery does not come within the broad limits of Rule 26(b)(1) or that 
the information sought is only marginally relevant and production would 
cause more harm than good.40  Potential evidence does not become 
relevant and discoverable simply because it exists.41 
Rule 26(b)(2) limits what a propounding party may seek.42  
Discovery requests are limited to those that are reasonable and not 
duplicative or available from other sources.43  A party who has 
squandered an earlier opportunity to obtain a document cannot later 
rectify the situation through court assistance.44  Courts can limit the 
propounding partys requests under Rule 26(b)(2) if the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.45  If the 
responding party claims a discovery request is overly burdensome, the 
responding party must establish the limiting factors.46  Moreover, Rule 
26(c)(1) gives the trial judge broad discretion to tailor discovery 
narrowly to protect a party from undue burden or expense.47 
Seeking parties can require a party to produce electronic documents 
under Rule 34.48  According to Rule 34(a), data compilations constitute 
documents, and parties are required to produce data compilations 
from which information can be obtained upon request.49  In addition, the 
1970 advisory amendment to Rule 34 provides specifically that Rule 34 
applies to electronic data compilations from which information can be 
                                                     
 38. AM Intl, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 F.R.D. 255, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (quoting 8 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008 
(1970)). 
 39. Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583, 585 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See In re Harmonic, Inc., No. C-00-2287 PJH, 2002 WL 31974384, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
13, 2002) (There is no obligation to disclose material information simply because it exists.), affd 
in part and revd in part by Kollenberg v. Harmonic, Inc., 152 Fed. Appx 674 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Thompson v. Dept of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Md. 2001); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). 
 47. Sasha K. Danna, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the Applicability of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 1688 (2005) (citing Jones 
v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002)). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
 49. Id. 34(a). 
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obtained only with the use of detection devices.50  These electronic 
documents must be produced as they are kept in the usual course of 
business.51  Metadata constitutes a data compilation under the broad 
definition provided in Rule 34.52   
2. The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Deal 
Explicitly with Electronic Discovery 
The December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure address the novel issues raised by electronic discovery.53  Rule 
34(a) was amended to explicitly include electronically stored 
information as a category of document that a seeking party can 
request.54  Rule 34(b) was amended to include the following language 
regarding the format in which electronic information must be produced: 
Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders, . . . 
(ii) if a request does not specify the form or forms for producing 
electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the 
information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained, or 
in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.55 
The Advisory Committee intended this amendment to ensure 
searchable electronic data be produced in a searchable, if not native, 
format.56  Courts determine the conformity of a responding partys 
production of electronic files to the rule . . . on a case-by-case basis.57 
The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) addresses the issue of producing 
material that has been deleted and is only preserved on backup storage.58  
More specifically, the amendment acknowledge[s] that producing such 
                                                     
 50. Id. 34(a) advisory committees note. 
 51. Id. 34(b). 
 52. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 64849 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 53. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 
10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, ¶ 7 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf (Black letter 
law is now to the effect that e-information is as susceptible to discovery rules and principles as 
paper.). 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
 55. Id. 34(b). 
 56. Id. 34(b) advisory committees note. 
 57. Pace v. Intl Mill Serv., Inc., No. 205 CV 69, 2007 WL 1385385, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 7, 
2007). 
 58. See Nathan Drew Larsen, Note, Evaluating the Proposed Changes to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37: Spoliation, Routine Operation and the Rules Enabling Act, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 212, ¶ 8 (2006), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v4/n2/4/ (discussing the 
differences between the life cycle of a paper document and an electronic file). 
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material can be highly burdensome and, in cases where such data is not 
reasonably accessible, [it] should not be discoverable.59  The 
amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) creates a presumption that information is 
outside the scope of discovery if the electronic document resides on a 
source that is not reasonably accessible, such that the relevance of the 
information to either the claims and defenses or the general subject 
matter of the litigation cannot be determined without incurring undue 
costs and burdens.60  The seeking party can challenge the presumption 
by the presentation of circumstantial evidence indicating that the data 
source contains relevant data.61 
Rule 37, addressing sanctions for discovery violations, was amended 
to read: Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of 
an electronic information system.62  When read along with the 
amendment to Rule 26(b)(2), the general rule is that companies cannot 
be sanctioned for routine spoliation of material not reasonably 
accessible.63  However, [t]he rule does not modify the sanctions 
currently available under Rule 37 if the spoliation of electronic discovery 
is found to be improper.64  The amendment does not address any 
responsibilities for a party prior to the filing of the lawsuit, nor does it 
articulate a positive duty of preservation.65 
C. Requiring Native Format Production, with Metadata Included, Is a 
Growing Trend 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit Advisory Board proposed that all 
documents shall be produced in electronic form (including metadata) 
absent specific objection, agreement of the parties, or order of the 
court.66  A year later, in Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., the 
court held: 
                                                     
 59. Id. 
 60. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 21 (2006). 
 61. Id. 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 63. Larsen, supra note 58, at ¶ 21. 
 64. Id. at ¶ 22. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Beckham, supra note 8, at 2 (citing Ninth Circuit Advisory Bd., Proposed Model Local 
Rule on Electronic Discovery, http://www.krollontrack.com/library/9thCirDraft.pdf (2004)). 
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[W]hen a party is ordered to produce electronic documents as they are 
maintained in the ordinary course of business, the producing party 
should produce the electronic documents with their metadata intact, 
unless that party timely objects to production of metadata, the parties 
agree that the metadata should not be produced, or the producing party 
requests a protective order.67 
The court elaborated on its holding by noting that the producing 
party has the initial burden to demonstrate that particular metadata is 
irrelevant because it has access to and is in control of the electronic 
document, thus enabling the producing party to extract or redact 
privileged or irrelevant metadata prior to production.68  The Williams 
court noted that its decision was consistent with the emerging standards 
of electronic discovery.69 
The Williams court framed the issue before it as follows: whether, 
under emerging standards of electronic discovery, the Courts Order 
directing Defendant to produce electronic spreadsheets as they are kept 
in the ordinary course of business requires Defendant to produce those 
documents with the metadata intact.70  The propounding party sought to 
compel the producing party to produce spreadsheet cells containing 
information relevant to a reduction in force.71 
The Williams court considered the electronic discovery guidelines 
proposed by the Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic 
Document Production among the emerging standards in electronic 
discovery.72  To understand why the court relied on the Sedona 
Guidelines, it is necessary to gain some background knowledge on the 
group: 
The Sedona Conference exists to allow leading jurists, lawyers, experts, 
academics and others, at the cutting edge of issues in the area of 
antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual property rights, to 
come together - in conferences and mini-think tanks (Working Groups) 
- and engage in true dialogue, not debate, all in an effort to move the 
law forward in a reasoned and just way.73 
                                                     
 67. 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 65152. 
 70. Id. at 651.  Given rule 34(b)s requirement that requested documents be produced as they 
are kept in the ordinary course of business, it is safe to assume that all document requests ordered 
by the court require producing parties to produce documents in such a manner. 
 71. Id. at 642. 
 72. Id. at 65052. 
 73. The Sedona Conference Mission, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_mission/ 
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The court focused on Principles 9 and 12 from the Electronic Document 
Working Group.74  Principle 12 states that [u]nless it is material to 
resolving the dispute, there is no obligation to preserve and produce 
metadata absent agreement of the parties or order of the court.75  
Comment 12.a to the Sedona Principles further provides that if the 
producing party knows or should reasonably know that particular 
metadata is relevant to the dispute, it should be produced.76 
Although the court alludes to the Sedona Principles, the holding in 
Williams favors a stricter metadata production requirement than the 
Sedona Principles.  For instance, Comment 12.a to the Sedona Principles 
states that [a]lthough there are exceptions to every rule, especially in an 
evolving area of the law, there should be a modest legal presumption in 
most cases that the producing party need not take special efforts to 
preserve or produce metadata.77  The court acknowledges that the 
Sedona Principles articulate a general presumption against the 
production of metadata,78 but found that the facts before the court fit the 
caveat that requires production of metadata when the producing party is 
aware or should reasonably be aware that particular metadata is relevant 
to the dispute.79 
The Williams approach is not rogue; it has been followed in other 
jurisdictions.  In Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc., 
for example, the court held that absent compelling reasons by the 
producing party, an electronic document must be produced in its native 
format with original metadata intact.80  Additionally, in Hagenbuch v. 
3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., the court held that a seeking 
party is entitled to materials in the format in which the producing party 
keeps them in the ordinary course of business because metadata was lost 
when the producing party converted the information in Tagged Image 
File Format (TIFF) documents.81  Unlike Williams, neither the Nova 
                                                                                                                       
show_page_html (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). 
 74. Principle 9 is focused primarily on preservation and production of compromised electronic 
data and thus is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Principle 9 states: Absent a showing of special 
need and relevance a responding party should not be required to preserve, review, or produce 
deleted, shadowed, fragmented or residual data or documents.  THE SEDONA CONFERENCE July 
2005, supra note 16, at i. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 47. 
 77. Id. at 46 (citing Pub. Citizen v. Carlin, 184 F.3d 900, 90811 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 78. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 81. No. 04 C 3109, 2006 WL 665005, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006).  [T]he tiff documents do 
not contain information such as the creation and modification dates of a document, e-mail 
attachments and recipients, and metadata.  Id.  A TIFF-file, like a .pdf file, is essentially an 
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Measuring nor Hagenbuch courts qualified their holdings with a 
requirement that the producing party be aware that metadata is relevant 
to the dispute. 
In Hagenbuch, the court required production of electronic documents 
in native format and with metadata intact.82  The court cited the 
differences between the TIFF format in which the defendant produced 
electronic documents and native format, noting that unlike the original 
electronic media, the TIFF documents do not contain information such as 
the creation and modification dates of a document, e-mail attachments 
and recipients, and metadata.83  The seeking party characterized, and the 
court agreed, that the producing party creat[ed] new documents when 
it converted files from native format into TIFF format.84  The court also 
cited as a rationale that the defendant did not maintain the relevant 
documents in TIFF format in the usual course of business.85  Finally, 
the court noted that the information defendant unilaterally subtracted 
when it produced TIFF images of documents was relevant under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).86 
The Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc. court 
required native format production with metadata intact citing only the 
holding in In re Verisign, Inc. Securities Litigation as authority.87  The In 
re Verisign court held that even though a large, potentially burdensome 
volume of electronic information was at stake, the producing party must 
produce electronic documents in native format with metadata intact.88  
The In re Verisign court noted that the producing parties burden was 
prompted by their own noncompliance and that they were solely at 
fault for their now inconvenient predicament.89  The court deferred to 
the Magistrate Judges opinion that native format production would not 
be overly burdensome for the producing party.90 
Although the rule requiring metadata production is the majority rule, 
some courts have instituted rules more favorable to producing parties.  In 
CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., the court denied the 
                                                                                                                       
electronic printout of a data file.  TIFF files do not contain the metadata present when the file was in 
native format.  In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 10, 2004). 
 82. 2006 WL 665005, at *4. 
 83. Id. at *3. 
 84. Id. at *2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *3. 
 87. 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 88. No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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plaintiffs request to have the defendant produce emails in native 
formatincluding attachmentswith accompanying metadata intact.91  
The court based its decision on the difficulty the producing party would 
encounter sorting out emails containing privileged information92 because 
of the producing partys software incompatibility problem.93  The 
court, however, reserved the right to order the producing party to 
produce documents in native format if the seeking party was able to 
show the need for a specific . . . file and a means to secure this without 
the production of privileged or irrelevant documents.94  In Wyeth v. 
Impax Laboratories, Inc., the court held that a seeking party must 
demonstrate a particular need for an electronic document in native 
format.95  The court did allow that a seeking party could demonstrate 
need at some point during discovery, and thus the producing party must 
preserve the integrity of the electronic document it produces.96 
In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount, the 
court modified a discovery order during litigation to require a party to 
produce metadata.97  The plaintiff requested documents be presented 
with metadata intact and the defendant failed to comply.98  The 
defendants sought to force plaintiffs to produce metadata.99  The court 
excused the plaintiffs earlier non-compliance but required metadata 
production in the future.100 
In its Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of 
Electronically Stored Information, the Conference of Chief Justices notes 
that paper production of electronic information is counter-intuitive 
because valuable information would be lost in the transition and the 
resulting product would be costly to store.101  The Conference also notes 
that converting native format electronic information into image files 
negates the advantage of searchability.102  The Conference recommends 
production in the format in which information is ordinarily maintained 
                                                     
 91. No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *3. 
 94. Id. at *4. 
 95. No. Civ.A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006). 
 96. Id. 
 97. No. MD 05-1720(JG)(JO), 2007 WL 121426, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 98. Id. at *12. 
 99. Id. at *1. 
 100. Id. at *5. 
 101. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING 
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION vi (Aug. 2006), available at http://www. 
ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 6. 
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but stops short of recommending metadata production in every 
instance.103  However, the Conference recommends a case-by-case 
determination of whether parties must produce metadata.104 
D. Existing Protections for Producing Parties 
1. Court-Imposed Qualifications and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
In reaction to the plaintiff-friendly rule of native format and 
metadata production, some courts that required metadata production have 
instituted protections to ease the burden on producing parties.  For 
example, one court has held that the metadata preservation requirement 
is applicable only when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.105  Another 
has held that metadata production is required only if the propounding 
party specifically requests metadata or if the producing party knows 
the metadata is relevant to the dispute.106  The producing party can object 
to the propounding partys request, and if the court grants the objection, 
the producing party will not be required to produce metadata.107  In 
addition, a propounding party is generally not allowed direct access to a 
producing partys electronic information.108 
The producing party also has a right to object to discovery requests 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b).  An objection to a Rule 34 
request should be stated with some specificity,109 and boilerplate 
objections or blanket refusals inserted into a response to a Rule 34 
request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a 
privilege.110  When determining whether to sustain a producing partys 
objection, the court should consider the magnitude of the document 
production.111  The court in Treppel v. Biovail Corp. denied a producing 
partys request that it not be required to produce electronic information 
                                                     
 103. Id. at 67. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 106. Williams v. Sprint United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005); see also THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE July 2005, supra note 16, at 47. 
 107. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652. 
 108. Bob Barker Co. v. Ferguson Safety Prods., Inc., No. C 04 04813 JW (RS), 2006 WL 
648674, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006). 
 109. Ava K. Doppelt, Developing and Executing the Discovery Plan: What Do You Need, 74 
A.L.I. 13, 89 (2005). 
 110. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 
1149 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 939 (2005). 
 111. Id. 
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in native format with metadata intact because the producing party 
provided no substantive basis for its objection.112 
2. Courts Honor Document Destruction and Retention Policies 
A party will not be sanctioned for failing to produce responsive 
documents if the documents were destroyed consistent with the partys 
document retention policy.113  The Rambus court deferred to the 
producing partys policy and reasoned that the seeking party failed to 
provide evidence that the policy was specifically aimed at destroying 
documents relevant to the litigation and the policy was installed prior to 
the point at which litigation was reasonably foreseeable.114  The court 
honored the producing partys document retention policy because it was 
in place prior to the time at which the path to litigation was clear or 
immediate.115  The Rambus court did, however, qualify its holding by 
saying the holding did not mean that a party can destroy documents 
with impunity prior to contemplation of actual litigation.  The 
implementation of a document retention policy that was intentionally 
designed to discard damaging documents should litigation later become 
probable or actually commence would be improper.116  In Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, a case involving traditional paper 
discovery, the United States Supreme Court held that compliance with a 
valid document retention policy was a legitimate defense to destruction 
of would-be relevant documents.117 
3. Courts Use Sanctions to Promote Compliance with Electronic 
Discovery Rules 
Courts can balance electronic discovery obligations by threatening 
sanctions against seeking parties who make unwieldy requests, including 
those requesting a large volume of documents and those requesting 
documents difficult for the producing party to access.118  For example, in 
                                                     
 112. 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 113. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 565893, at 
*25 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006). 
 114. Id. at *2425. 
 115. Id. at *22. 
 116. Id. at *25. 
 117. 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
 118. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ([C]ost-
shifting should be considered only when electronic discovery imposes an undue burden or expense 
on the responding party.); see infra Part III.E.1. 
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Zubulake, the court threatened to shift the costs of discovery to the 
seeking party as a consequence of its potentially unwieldy discovery 
request when relevant information was inaccessible.119  The Zubulake 
court announced seven factors to consider when determining whether to 
shift discovery costs: 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; 
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to 
each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to 
do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.120 
 
Cost-shifting and other sanctions protect producing parties from 
unduly burdensome electronic discovery requests. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Metadata Provides Litigants and Courts with a More Complete and 
Accurate Record on Which to Resolve a Dispute 
A metadata production requirement results in a more complete 
record on which the court can rule.  Rather than just having the 
information printed on a page, the court and propounding party also have 
access to the infrastructure under that printed information.  The 
advantages offered by electronic documents and metadata should be 
embraced, not avoided. 
                                                     
 119. 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 120. Id. 
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1. Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co.  
The facts of Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co.121 illustrate 
the value of metadata and why parties devote substantial effort to arguing 
about whether it must be produced.  The dispute in Williams arose after a 
large corporation decided to downsize its workforce and a group of 
workers brought suit alleging the corporation relied on age-ist factors to 
terminate employees.122  The propounding party in Williams sought to 
discover a spreadsheet that contained information regarding the reduction 
in force.123  The spreadsheet contained the product of a formula used to 
derive a value on which the reductions were baseda formula plaintiffs 
alleged was age-ist.124  The producing party provided the spreadsheet in 
TIFF format, denying the seeking party and the court evidence (the 
formula, which was contained in metadata) critical to plaintiffs claim.125  
The value in the spreadsheet was meaningless absent the formula from 
which the value was derived.126  In other words, the electronic nature of 
the document resulted in an altogether different document than a similar 
spreadsheet created before the age of computers.  Although the 
propounding party did not seek hard copy printouts, the printouts would 
have presented the same issues as did the TIFF files. 
2. Metadata is of Great Evidentiary Value 
As illustrated by Williams, without metadata, some electronic 
documents are no more valuable than a random list of numbers.  If the 
purpose of discovery is for the parties to obtain the fullest possible 
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial,127 then a very pro-
metadata production rule should be instituted.  As the Williams court 
pointed out, metadata can be the key factor in showing how data on the 
face of the electronic document relate to each other.128  Metadata is the 
code through which electronic data can be interpreted.129  Metadata 
                                                     
 121. 230 F.R.D. 640, 641 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 642. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 643. 
 126. See id. at 647 (To understand the spreadsheet, the user must be able to ascertain the 
formula within the cell.). 
 127. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 405, 501 (1947). 
 128. See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647 ([M]etadata is the key to showing the relationships 
between the data.). 
 129. See id. ([W]ithout such metadata, the tables of data would have little meaning.). 
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allows a seeking party to connect individuals to particular decisions and 
ideas, to determine who knew what and when, and how the producing 
partys position on a specific issue changed over time.130 
Metadata provides an insight into documents that simply did not 
exist prior to the information age and the widespread use of computers.  
The information offered by metadata previously was only accessible in 
the minds of those individuals or entities that created a document.  
Before metadata infiltrated discovery, a producing party was not required 
to account for changes in documents or the absence of documents from 
productionthe document itself was the only evidence by which the 
court could make a determination. 
3. Metadata Serves as a Check on the Producing Partys Compliance 
Requiring production of electronic documents in native format and 
with metadata intact eliminates the temptation for producing parties to 
alter electronic documents after litigation is underway but before 
discovery is complete.  For example, a producing party required to 
produce a spreadsheet with smoking gun evidence supporting plaintiffs 
claim will be unable to delete an incriminating column of information 
after the party realizes litigation is imminent. 
Metadata serves a policing purpose by tracking any alterations131
metadata allows a seeking party (and the court) to discover if the 
producing party has made any changes to the document between the 
point when the document was created and the time it was produced.132  A 
document cannot be modified without that modification being reflected 
in the metadata.133  Courts should embrace the benefits offered by 
metadata instead of looking at them as a hindrance to efficient discovery.  
To utilize metadata to its fullest extent, courts should craft rules that 
promote metadata preservation and ensure metadata accessibility during 
discovery.  If for no other reason, metadata production should be 
required because it guarantees that relevant electronic documents are 
being produced in their most genuine form.  This is a luxury the judiciary  
 
                                                     
 130. See Beckham, supra note 8, at 13 ([M]etatdata may reveal the date a certain fact was 
known, which is crucial in tort and product liability actions.). 
 131. Id. at 2. 
 132. See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646 (Metadata reveals a files name, a files location (e.g., 
directory structure or pathname), file format or file type, file size, file dates (e.g., creation date, date 
of last modification), and file permissions (e.g., who can read the data, who can write it, who can run 
it).). 
 133. Id. 
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should embrace because it allows a check on authenticity of documents 
unavailable in traditional paper discovery. 
4. Requiring Metadata Production Would Ensure Uniformity in the 
Format in Which Documents Are Produced 
The trend toward electronic maintenance of documents is unlikely to 
change.  A broad metadata production requirement would bring 
uniformity to the issue of production format.  There are multiple formats 
(e.g., TIFF, .pdf, printouts), in which electronic information can be 
produced, and it is likely that technological developments will result in a 
greater variety of production formats. 
If there was a rebuttable presumption of metadata relevance (and 
thus a presumptive metadata production requirement under Federal Rule 
26), an element of predictability and uniformity would come to the 
electronic discovery debate.  Such uniformity is consistent with 
Congress intent of uniformity in the federal courts.134  Every electronic 
document contains metadata,135 and thus a presumptive requirement of 
metadata production would alleviate or eliminate disputes over how 
electronic documents may have been manipulated prior to production.  
With metadata intact, any evidence of document manipulation, regardless 
of format, will be reflected in the metadata.136 
B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Justify Requiring Metadata 
Production 
1. The Current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Require Production of 
Relevant Information 
Metadata behind relevant documents will rarely, if ever, be irrelevant 
under Rule 26(b)(1).137  In addition, if the producing party fails to 
produce relevant metadata upon a seeking partys request, the court may 
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the action.138  If the court can order discovery of relevant metadata 
under Rule 26(b)(1), and if the seeking party is aware of the metadata (as 
                                                     
 134. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, 
J., dissenting). 
 135. Beckham, supra note 8, at 3. 
 136. Id. at 2; see also Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646. 
 137. See supra Part I. 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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they likely will be if requesting electronic documents), then it is logical 
to require production of metadata for all relevant electronic documents as 
an initial matter under Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
If the producing party objects to metadata production on grounds that 
it was prepared in preparation for trial, the seeking party would still 
likely be able to obtain the information under Rule 26(b)(3).139  For 
example, consider again the spreadsheet in Williams.  The seeking party 
wants to discover how a particular valuethe value upon which the 
producing party relied to make its decision about whose employment to 
terminatewas derived.  The seeking party will likely have little 
difficulty showing a substantial need of the materials140 because the 
formula potentially presents smoking gun evidence and is necessary to 
understanding the information on the face of the document.  In addition, 
the formula, because it is peculiar to the cells in the spreadsheet, is 
unlikely to be obtained by the seeking party by other means.141 
The producing party may argue that it is protected under Rule 
26(b)(2) and may ask the court to limit the seeking partys request 
because it is overly burdensome.  This argument, however, is flawed.  It 
is more burdensome to remove metadata than it is to produce 
metadata.142  Metadata production requires no action aside from 
production of the electronic document while metadata removal requires 
scrubbing of metadataa process that can be time-consuming and 
expensive143or conversion of electronic documents into .pdf or TIFF 
image files. 
A presumption of relevance and required production of metadata 
would alleviate the judicial uncertainty and time consumption created by 
Rule 37 motions to compel documents.  Granted, the Federal Rules 
anticipate that parties will not produce relevant information in its 
mandatory disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), but a presumption of 
metadata relevance would result in more uniform metadata production 
and, ideally, Rule 37 motions to compel would arise less frequently. 
                                                     
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Orange County Bar Assn Comm. on Professionalism and Ethics, Formal Op. 2005-01 
(2006) (discussing duties regarding metadata and filing). 
 143. See id. at 44. 
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2. The Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Further Substantiate 
a Rebuttable Presumption of Metadata Relevance 
The amendment to Rule 34(b), requiring production in a form or 
forms in which [the document] is ordinarily maintained,144 strengthens 
the argument for required metadata production.  Metadata accompanies 
every electronic document, and, unless the producing party has a policy 
that metadata is destroyed as part of its ordinary maintenance of 
electronic files, metadata will accompany the production of the electronic 
document.145  The amendment allows for agreement between the parties 
or court order to produce the electronic documents in a form other than 
which they are ordinarily maintained.146  This exception grants producing 
parties sufficient protection if the party is opposed to producing 
metadata. 
The amendment to Rule 37 provides additional protection for 
producing parties that have a document policy in place whereby metadata 
is scrubbed or certain types of documents are destroyed altogether.147  
Consequently, parties involved in litigation can protect themselves with 
the institution of a policy under which metadata is routinely scrubbed.  
The amendment does not, however, protect parties from improper 
spoliation of electronic information.148 
The amended Rule 37 will only serve the goal of broad discovery if 
courts interpret the protection for document destruction policies 
narrowly, that is, if document retention polices are scrutinized.  The 
good-faith149 requirement should be read to include not only the 
implementation of the policy, but also the creation of the policy.  For 
instance, if a partys policy is to scrub metadata from every document 
produced, that policy should be void on its face.  Scrubbing metadata is 
an arduous taskas producing parties will argue when they are asked to 
redact privileged information from a large volume of documentsand a 
policy of metadata scrubbing can serve little purpose other than to hinder 
any opponent who seeks metadata during discovery. 
There are bound to be instances when relevant documents are 
destroyed pursuant to a legitimate document destruction policy.  When 
determining whether to issue sanctions for spoliation, the court should 
                                                     
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b). 
 145. See Beckham, supra note 8, at 34. 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b). 
 147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37; Larsen, supra note 58, at 219. 
 148. See Larsen, supra note 58, at 220. 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
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engage in a two-step process: (1) whether the policy was created in good 
faith; and (2) whether the destruction was consistent with the policy.  
Courts will have to make this determination on a case-by-case basis.  In 
making this determination, courts should consider factors such as the 
partys rationale for its policy, the percentage of relevant documents that 
have been destroyed, the likelihood that the destroyed information could 
potentially have been relevant in litigation (for example, if the producing 
party in Williams had destroyed the spreadsheet containing the formula it 
used to fire a category of employees), and whether the party consulted an 
information technology specialist in its drafting of the policy (to ensure 
that an expert took part in the creation of the policy).150  If the case-by-
case approach results in inconsistency, it may be advisable to include in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a rule requiring metadata 
preservation. 
C.  Stricter Rules for Metadata Production and Preservation Are 
Necessary 
Stricter rules for metadata production and preservation are necessary.  
A soft rule on metadata production will have adverse effects on 
litigation.  Forgiving metadata production because of inconvenience to 
the producing party will create inconsistency and inequity.  Additionally, 
courts should avoid granting great deference to document destruction 
policies, interpreting the amendment to Rule 37 narrowly.  Plenty of 
existing rules are sufficient to protect the interest of producing parties, 
and in fact, presuming the relevance of metadata has its benefits for 
producing parties. 
 
1. A Rule Soft on Metadata Production Has Adverse Effects on 
Litigation 
Sedona Principle 12, which the Williams court referenced 
extensively in its opinion, is too soft on producing parties because it 
allows them to make the determination of whether metadata is material 
to resolving the dispute.151  There are two problems inherent in this 
approach: (1) the producing party has an incentive to determine 
particular metadata is irrelevant if it is damaging to its case; and (2) if the 
producing party makes a determination of irrelevance and scrubs the 
                                                     
 150. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 43334 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 151. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE July 2005, supra note 16, at i. 
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metadata, and it later turns out the scrubbed metadata is relevant, it might 
be too late if the party permanently erased the metadata.  If left up to the 
producing party to decide, the producing party will rarely know 
metadata supporting the opponents case is relevant to the dispute.152  
When a party must choose between not producing a potentially damaging 
document or producing the document in its native format, with metadata 
intact, parties will almost certainly choose the former.  Such abuse can be 
countered with sanctions, but sanctions will not compensate the 
propounding party (or the court, for that matter) for frustration and time 
lost squabbling over the partys failure to produce relevant metadata.153  
In addition, if, as is consistent with Sedona Principle 12, the producing 
party has unilaterally determined that metadata is not material to 
resolving the dispute, the producing party will have already scrubbed 
the metadata or taken the time to convert the files from native format to 
image files.  If the court determines the missing metadata is in fact 
relevant to the dispute, the producing party will be forced to reproduce 
the electronic document in native format with metadata intact154 (if the 
metadata has not already been destroyed) and the time and effort the 
producing party invested in converting the documents will have been 
wasted. 
Metadata, because it is so closely related to the information visible 
on the face of the electronic document, will rarely be irrelevant when the 
document itself is relevant.  Therefore, a better approach is to simply 
presume metadata relevance, allow the producing party to redact 
privileged information from the metadata, and then have the producing 
party produce all the remaining metadata and allow the seeking party to 
sift through the data and determine metadata relevance for itself.  Sedona 
Principle 12 fails to take into account the reality that if an electronic 
document is relevant, the documents metadata is (in all but very rare 
circumstances) relevant by default.155  For example, even with a word 
processing document, for which metadata is usually not critical to 
understanding the substance of the document,156 metadata, if nothing 
else, allows the seeking to party to discover if the producing party has 
altered the document in any way between the time it was created and the 
time it was produced.  The argument for presumptive relevance of 
                                                     
 152. Id. at 47. 
 153. See supra Part III.E.1. 
 154. CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615, 
at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006). 
 155. E.g., id. 
 156. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647 (D. Kan. 2005). 
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metadata is even stronger for spreadsheets and databases, because 
without metadata these types of documents are a completely 
undifferentiated mass of tables of data.157 
2. A Rule Forgiving Metadata Production Because of Inconvenience to 
the Producing Party Results in Inconsistency and Inequity 
The CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. General Electric Co. court excused 
metadata production because of the large volume of information at 
issue.158  The court excused a party from producing metadata related to 
email documents because it would have been too burdensome for the 
party to redact privileged information from the mass of emails.159  This 
rule sets a precedent extremely unfair to seeking parties: metadata 
production may not be required if there is a large amount of relevant 
electronic information that is difficult to produce because of the 
producing partys own technology errors.  This rule essentially excuses 
large corporations from producing metadata because it simply would 
take too much time and expense to properly prepare the information for 
production.  The ultimate result is that a stricter rule is in place for 
parties in cases where there is not a huge volume of relevant electronic 
information.  Granted, this holding may entice seeking parties to more 
carefully articulate their discovery requests, but it is hardly in the spirit 
of broad discovery.160 
Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) allows the court to limit discovery if the 
burden outweighs the benefit,161 but, at least in the case of emails, rarely 
will the date of the message, the recipients of the message, or the author 
of the message not be beneficial.  Furthermore, there is no burden in 
producing metadata beyond the necessary burden incurred by producing 
required electronic documents.  There is, of course, the burden of 
examining the metadata and redacting privileged information, but it is 
unlikely that metadata will contain privileged information when the 
email itself does not.  This fact would expedite the process and decrease 
the burden on the producing party, making a limitation by the court less 
necessary and less likely. 
Requiring frequent judicial determination of the burden of metadata 
production will create inconsistencies potentially harmful to seeking 
                                                     
 157. Id. 
 158. No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615, at *34 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 638 (1977). 
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(ii). 
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parties.  Unfairness to seeking parties can result in two ways: (1) 
different courts will have different views on what constitutes undue 
burden, and (2) parties frequently involved in litigation have an incentive 
to make metadata retrieval difficult (this would require that the 
producing party even has access to the metadata because in order to 
create any metadata retrieval burden, the producing party must have 
taken measures to separate the metadata from the document).  No burden 
exists, of course, if the metadata was never scrubbed or otherwise 
separated from the electronic document.  The court in In re Verisign 
recognized this reality.162  The producing party argued that it would be 
too burdensome to produce documents in their native format after it had 
scrubbed metadata and converted the documents to an image format.163  
The court penalized the producing party by ordering it to produce 
relevant documents in native format with metadata intact.164 
3. Courts Should Interpret the Amendment to Rule 37 Narrowly and 
Not Grant Great Deference to Document Destruction Policies 
The amendment to Rule 37 protects producing parties who fail to 
produce information as a result of good-faith adherence to a document 
destruction policy,165 but good-faith operation of an extremely pro-
destructive policy has the same result for the seeking party as intentional 
destruction.  Once again, like the judicial decisions, no measure is in 
place to evaluate a partys destruction policy.  If the amendment to Rule 
37 is to have a fair effect on parties involved in electronic discovery, the 
Rule must set forth how courts should evaluate the producing partys 
document destruction policy.  Even then, it may be too late for the 
seeking party as the document or metadata may have been permanently 
deleted. 
The perfect rule would allow for evaluation of every document 
retention/destruction policy in existenceeven before litigation has 
begun or is reasonably foreseeable.  This is not feasible for obvious 
                                                     
 162. In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 10, 2004). 
 163. Id. at *2. 
 164. Id. at *3. 
 165. See Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, at 33, Sept. 2005, (Proposed amendment 37(f) states that absent exceptional 
circumstances, sanctions may not be imposed under the civil rules if electronically stored 
information sought in discovery has been lost as a result of the routine operation of an electronic 
information system, as long as that operation is in good faith.), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf. 
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reasons.  However, this result could be manipulated by the threat and use 
of harsh sanctions for parties, once their policies are reviewable during 
the discovery process, that have instituted destruction policies that call 
for destruction of all or virtually all potentially relevant electronic 
information. 
The courts in Arthur Andersen166 and Hynix Semiconductor167 put a 
great deal of power in the hands of producing parties by yielding to 
document destruction policies.168  The potential left open for abuse 
reveals a need for courts to be wary of and closely scrutinize a producing 
partys document retention or destruction policy.  By honoring 
preexisting document destruction policies, and by not placing any limits 
on such policies, courts are encouraging entities frequently involved in 
litigation to create extremely pro-destruction document destruction 
policies.  Parties will always be able to assert that the policy was in place 
prior to the point at which litigation was reasonably foreseeable as a 
defense.  Such a result could hardly be said to serve the ends of justice.  
To protect against such abuse, courts should back off Arthur Andersen-
like protection for producing parties involved in electronic discovery.  
The Hynix Semiconductor court recognized as much when it included a 
caveat in its holding saying that its honoring of the producing partys 
document policy by no means meant that such policies will be honored 
de facto.169 
As a general rule, the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are consistent with preexisting case law.  The amended Rule 
37 is consistent with the holdings in Arthur Andersen and Hynix 
Semiconductor in its honoring of a partys document 
retention/destruction policy.  The amendment to Rule 34(a), explicitly 
including electronically stored information in the definition of a 
document, is consistent with the Williams courts reading of current Rule 
34 (as it should be because the Williams court relied on the proposed 
amendments).170  The Williams courts rule requiring a party to produce 
electronic information in the format in which it is ordinarily maintained 
is also consistent with the amendment to Rule 34(b). 
                                                     
 166. 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 167. No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 565893 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006). 
 168. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 169. See 2006 WL 565893, at *25 (The court concludes that Rambus did not engage in 
unlawful spoliation of evidence . . . .  The implementation of a document retention policy . . . 
intentionally designed to discard damaging documents . . . would be improper.). 
 170. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005). 
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4. Traditional Tactics Available to Producing Parties are Sufficient to 
Protect Their Interests 
The requirement of native-format metadata production is not as one-
sided as the defense bar might argue.  For instance, the holding in 
Williams does not require a party to produce metadata unless the 
producing party is aware or should reasonably be aware that particular 
metadata is relevant.171  In other words, the Williams rule is not a 
blanket metadata requirement.  In addition, the Williams rule explicitly 
allows for a producing party to lodge an objection to the production of 
metadata.172  The rule is far from onerous or unwieldy for producing 
parties. 
The producing party can, under Rule 34(b), object to production of 
metadata, and, if the court finds merit in the objection, the producing 
party can scrub the metadata making it unavailable to the propounding 
party.  There is no reason to believe Rule 34 objections will fail to 
protect adequately parties objecting to metadata production when it has, 
by all accounts, protected producing parties objecting to production of 
paper documents. 
The producing party also has the option of redacting privileged 
information.  Parties can redact information if it is protected by the 
attorney-client privilege173 or the work product privilege.174  Although 
the court can limit requests under Rule 26(b)(2),175 it is difficult to 
reconcile the decision in CP Solutionsforgiving non-native format 
production because to redact privileged information from the documents 
in native format would have been too burdensome because it had already 
converted the documents into image format176with Rule 26(b)(1), 
which allows discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party.177 
                                                     
 171. Id. at 651. 
 172. Id. 
 173. The attorney-client privilege applies (1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, 
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from 
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.  JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961). 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 175. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 176. CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615, 
at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006). 
 177. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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Beyond these protections, a producing party should have nothing to 
hide in metadata.  Before a court allows the party to produce in a format 
other than the native format because of convenience, the court should at 
least consider cost-shiftingthat is, put the risk on the propounding 
party that if nothing in the documents it seeks to compel is relevant, then 
the court can impose the costs of document production on the 
propounding party.178 
Defenders of producing parties will likely argue that if producing 
parties are required to produce metadata in every instance, the defendant, 
like the defendant in CP Solutions, will have to go through a tedious, 
time-consuming process every time a plaintiff brings a suit against them.  
However, there is a solution that can ease the life of parties frequently 
involved in litigation: maintain documents in the form in which they are 
kept in the ordinary course of business, in native format, with metadata 
intact, and there will be no issue with reverting image files back into 
native format. 
5. A Rebuttable Presumption of Metadata Relevance Is Not a One-
Sided Rule 
Parties frequently involved in litigation, and thus frequent recipients 
of discovery requests, might ask how a presumption of metadata 
relevance benefits them.  After all, the party would be forced to preserve 
electronic information that could potentially serve as smoking gun 
evidence against it.  This is a valid argument presuming the producing 
party is guilty as charged by the seeking party.  However, the frequent 
litigant would be spared the uncertainty of how to produce electronic 
documents once discovery commences.  Further, a rule presuming 
metadata relevanceor any rule requiring frequent litigants to maintain 
documents of potential evidentiary valueserves as a deterrent to 
engage in illegal activities. 
                                                     
 178. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that 
cost-shifting is to be considered when electronic discovery imposes an undue burden or expense on 
the responding party). 
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D. The Greater Evidentiary Value of Metadata Compared to its Paper 
Discovery Equivalent Justifies a Stricter Rule for Electronic 
Discovery 
Opponents to requisite metadata disclosure might argue that parties 
are not required to produce any paper analog to metadata.  Before 
addressing this concern, it must first be determined what traditional 
discovery material is analog to metadata.  Previous drafts of paper 
documents provide some, but not all of the information contained in 
metadata.  For example, if the final draft of a paper document lists no 
author, it is unlikely that any previous version will list an author.  
Likewise, for a spreadsheet listing values derived from a formula 
computed on a calculator, there was unlikely any record of the calculator 
computation.  Previous drafts would, however, enable the seeking party 
to compare the final draft and discover which changes have been made 
along the way, although not by whom.  Unlike the track changes 
mechanism in metadata, which lingers behind the electronic document, 
previous drafts of documents are typically destroyed or discarded and 
lost forever. 
The difference with a requirement of previous draft production and 
metadata production lies primarily in organization and searchability.  
With electronic discovery, the seeking party need not look at metadata at 
allthe distinction between the actual document and metadata is clear.  
Actual text and metadata are easily separable.  With previous drafts in 
traditional paper discovery, unless the court requires the producing party 
to neatly organize all paperwork and group together all final drafts with 
previous attempts, the seeking party is required to page through what 
could amount to stacks of documents in order to find the relevant 
documents among many drafts.  The likelihood of such an order is slim 
because of the immense burden it would impose on producing parties. 
Requiring production of electronic documents in native format and 
with metadata intactwith a presumption of metadata relevance
actually relieves the producing party of costly and time-consuming 
preparatory work.179  If a strict metadata production rule were instituted 
and parties understood that metadata was presumed relevant, producing 
parties would actually be prohibited from the tedious process of 
converting native format files into .pdf or similar image format.  
                                                     
 179. See In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 10, 2004) (holding that the burden of producing documents in their native format is a 
question of fact). 
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Producing parties will only be obligated to redact privileged information 
and can produce the responsive documents in a tidy electronic media 
format. 
E. A Rebuttable Presumption of Metadata Relevance Promotes Good 
Lawyering 
 Finally, a rebuttable presumption of metadata production will 
promote good lawyering.  Sanctioning electronic discovery violations 
will ensure that lawyers and their clients comply with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Further, requiring metadata production will force 
attorneys to become competent regarding metadata. 
 
1. Sanctions for Electronic Discovery Violations Would Help to Ensure 
Compliance with the Federal Rules 
In order to encourage metadata preservation and ultimate production, 
courts must impose stiff sanctions on parties who willfully spoliate 
metadata after the point at which litigation is reasonably foreseeable.  
Courts have developed a list of sanctions to be levied against parties 
abusing electronic discovery, including granting the seeking party direct 
access to the producing partys electronic files,180 cost-shifting,181 
payment of costs incurred as a result of late production,182 and an adverse 
inference instruction if a producing party willfully spoliates evidence.183  
The court can also sanction a violating party by precluding the violating 
party from using information contained in electronic documents it failed 
to produce in a timely manner184 and can even dismiss the case with 
prejudice if the violating party is sufficiently culpable.185  The severity of 
these sanctions is enough of a stick to encourage producing parties to 
comply with electronic discovery guidelines.  By consistently imposing 
sanctions, courts can promote consistent production of metadata and the 
benefits that accompany its production. 
                                                     
 180. See In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating the district 
courts decision to allow direct access to electronic files but noting such access might be 
permissible in certain cases). 
 181. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC  (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 31618 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 182. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Thompson v. Dept of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 10405 (D. Md. 2003). 
 185. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (reversing the 
district court because there was insufficient culpability to justify the sanction of dismissal). 
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The cost-shifting sanction available to courts is an adequate check on 
the seeking partys requests.  A seeking party is unlikely to abuse its 
Rule 34 document request privileges with the looming specter of paying 
discovery costs.  If the seeking party has satisfied the first factor laid out 
by the Zubulake court (specifically tailored request),186 then the 
producing party should have no objection to producing the relevant 
electronic document. 
2. Requiring Metadata Production Will Force Attorneys to Become 
Competent Regarding Metadata 
The metadata production requirement forces parties to be aware that 
metadata exists.  The amendment to Rule 34(a) provides incentive for an 
attorney to understand the advantages offered by metadata discovery, 
because the amended Rules will recognize electronically stored 
information as a document.  Furthermore, Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.1 requires an attorney to be competent in her representation of 
his or her client: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.187  Courts have heightened expectations for attorneys 
involved in electronic discovery, including no longer accepting technical 
ignorance as an excuse for incompetence regarding electronic 
discovery.188  An attorney must also ensure his or her client is adhering to 
its document retention policy.189  As a result, attorneys on both sides of 
discovery need to be aware of the existence and contents of 
electronically stored information to competently represent their 
respective clients and be in compliance with the Federal Rules (for the 
attorney representing the producing party). 
If courts are lenient with attorneys who are, out of ignorance of the 
rules or a lack of understanding of the significance of metadata, 
incompetent regarding electronic discovery, great inequity and 
inconsistency would result.  Attorneys and their clients could feign 
ignorance and accidentally delete critical documents without the fear 
                                                     
 186. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 187. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2005). 
 188. See Metro. Opera Assn v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Intl Union, 
212 F.R.D. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that, among other actions, the attorney failed to 
explain to a non-lawyer that a document for the purposes of discovery encompasses documents in 
electronic form), affd on rehg, No. 00 Civ. 3613(LAP), 2004 WL 943099 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 
2004). 
 189. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 43132 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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of significant sanctions.  In the absence of competency-forcing 
consequences, attorneys have little incentive to become versed in 
electronic discovery matters and would thus be doing their client a 
disservice and potentially making false representations to the court in 
violation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.190  Competence 
must be prodded through a broad metadata production requirementa 
presumption of metadata relevancecoupled with significant sanctions 
for failure to adhere to the rules. 
Furthermore, if parties are aware of the existence of metadata, they 
are more likely to review the metadata for privileged information and are 
thus less likely to inadvertently disclose privileged information.  As a 
result, courts will not be required to confront the frustrating issue of 
inadvertent disclosure. 
[E]lectronic communications are no less deserving of privileged 
status than verbal or paper communications.191  Inadvertent disclosure 
of confidential or privileged material is inevitable as a consequence of 
the sheer volume of electronic documents in cases with discoverable 
electronic information.192  Inadvertent disclosure is especially 
problematic with metadata because many attorneys are unaware that 
potentially privileged information contained in metadata is not visible on 
the face of the document.193  Courts are divided on how to handle 
inadvertent disclosure, and inconsistency plagues the courts.194  Three 
approaches used by courts include (1) strict liability,195 (2) intent-
required,196 and (3) case-by-case multi-factor analysis.197  Under the strict 
liability approach, once a communication has been disclosed to a third 
party it is . . . no longer confidential.198  Under the intent-required 
approach, privilege can only intentionally be waived.199  Finally, under 
the case-by-case multi-factor analysis, factors such as precautions taken, 
delay between disclosure and attempts at rectification, and the extent of  
 
                                                     
 190. Model Rule 3.3(a) states [a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact 
or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal . . . .  MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2005). 
 191. Danna, supra note 47, at 1693. 
 192. Kiker, supra note 2, at ¶ 1. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 195. Id. at ¶¶ 912. 
 196. Id. at ¶¶ 1314. 
 197. Id. at ¶¶ 1520. 
 198. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 199. Id. at ¶ 13. 
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the disclosure are used to determine whether inadvertent disclosure 
waives privilege.200 
The inadvertent disclosure debacle could be made uniformin 
addition to becoming a less frequent occurrenceif a minimum level of 
attorney competence was required.  Strict liability would be a fair 
approach because if courts could safely presume attorneys are competent 
regarding metadata, constructive knowledge will be imputed to attorneys 
involved in electronic discovery and any disclosure of confidential 
information disclosed via metadata will be deemed to have waived the 
privilege.  The legal fiction that parties will not use information 
inadvertently disclosed can be avoided altogether. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of electronic discovery and metadata in particular, 
has forced courts to apply the discovery rules contained in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to an entirely different category of information.  
Prior to the institution of the amended Federal Rules, courts generally 
required metadata production with certain exceptions.201  In so doing, 
courts have taken a step in the right direction, but are not taking full 
advantage of the evidentiary benefits offered by metadata. 
Metadata serves as a watchdog on a producing party, tracking the 
partys every move as it relates to that document.  A party is required to 
produce metadata if it knows or should reasonably know that particular 
metadata is relevant to the dispute.202  Otherwise, the burden is on the 
seeking party to establish the relevance of particular metadata it is 
seeking.  If the burden were shifted to the producing partyif metadata 
were presumed relevantthe frequent problems of spoliation and 
inaccessibility would be alleviated. 
A metadata production requirement would provide the court with a 
more complete record on which to decide a case.203  If metadata is 
presumed relevant, attorneys would be forced to become competent 
regarding electronic discovery and would be in a better position to 
represent their clients.  Finally, a rule requiring that evidence-rich 
metadata be produced is consistent with the intent of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to promote broad discovery and provide parties the 
                                                     
 200. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 201. See supra Part II.C. 
 202. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE July 2005, supra note 16, at 47. 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
07 - BREEN FINAL.DOC 2/13/2008  4:42:38 PM 
2008] NOTHING TO HIDE 471 
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts as they prepare for 
trial.204 
 
                                                     
 204. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
